Polity28 October 20265 min read
Supreme Court Questions Drug Price Regulation, Exposing Gaps Between Constitutional Rights and Market Realities
The Trigger and What It Reveals
The Supreme Court recently told the Union government that economic policy cannot take precedence over the lives of citizens. The remark came while the court was questioning how India regulates medicine prices. At issue was the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) capping trade margins on 137 non-scheduled anti-cancer medicines at 30% of their maximum retail price (MRP). Trade margins are the difference between what intermediaries — distributors, retailers, hospitals — pay for a drug and what they charge patients. The court's concern was pointed: why does such a wide gap persist between hospital procurement prices and patient-facing prices, and why has the NPPA's intervention been confined to a subset of cancer drugs rather than extended more broadly?
The question is not merely procedural. It goes to the heart of how India has designed, and repeatedly struggled to enforce, its drug pricing architecture.
How the Regulatory Framework Is Built
India's drug price control system rests on three interlocking instruments. The Drugs (Prices Control) Order (DPCO), 2013, issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, is the primary legal tool. It empowers the government to fix ceiling prices for scheduled formulations — those listed in the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM) — while allowing manufacturers of non-scheduled medicines greater pricing flexibility, subject to an annual MRP increase cap of 10% over the preceding twelve months. For scheduled formulations, the DPCO incorporates a notional retailer margin of 16% into the ceiling price calculation.
The NPPA sits at the centre of this system. It fixes and revises drug prices under the DPCO, monitors compliance, and advises on pharmaceutical policy. The NLEM, prepared by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, determines which medicines are treated as priority healthcare needs and therefore candidates for price control. Inclusion in the NLEM is effectively the gateway to scheduled status and the stricter ceiling price regime.
The structural problem is the scheduled versus non-scheduled distinction. Drugs outside the NLEM face only the annual price increase cap and, in specific cases, government-imposed trade margin limits, as with the 30% cap on the 137 cancer drugs. This leaves a large portion of the market in a regulatory grey zone where markups can be substantial and enforcement is reactive at best.
Constitutional Stakes and Structural Fixes
The court's framing draws on Article 21, which guarantees the right to life, and Article 47, a Directive Principle that places an obligation on the state to raise the level of nutrition and public health. Courts have long read a right to health into Article 21, but the present case forces a more direct confrontation: when pharmaceutical industry interests conflict with catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditure on households, which consideration prevails in policy design?
The industry's concern about price controls dampening innovation is not trivial. It sits uneasily, though, alongside evidence of uneven enforcement across states and hospital procurement systems, and the NPPA's limited proactive record on trade margin violations.
The structural fixes the debate demands are reasonably well understood. The NPPA needs stronger price surveillance powers and proportionate penalties for violations. Hospitals and pharmacies should be required to disclose medicine prices and provide itemised bills. Expanding Jan Aushadhi Kendras and promoting generic prescribing would widen affordable access. Periodic revision of the NLEM to incorporate new therapies and updated disease burden data is also essential.
That last point matters more than it might appear. A static NLEM means newer, often expensive drugs remain non-scheduled indefinitely, beyond the reach of ceiling price controls, even as they become standard of care. The Supreme Court's intervention, whatever its eventual outcome, has made it harder for the government to treat this as a problem manageable through calibrated, incremental steps alone.