Economy28 October 20265 min read
India's Semiconductor Missions Race to Close a USD 150 Billion Import Gap
The Geopolitical Weight of a Chip
The global semiconductor market grew at a CAGR of 6.5% between 2014 and 2024 and is projected to accelerate to 8.5% over the next five to ten years. That growth is concentrated in a handful of countries. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, China, and the United States dominate global chip manufacturing, with Taiwan alone accounting for over 60% of global production and nearly 90% of advanced chips. When supply chains snagged during the pandemic and again amid US-China technology tensions, the world was reminded that semiconductors are not merely industrial inputs. They are instruments of geopolitical leverage, and countries without domestic capacity are effectively dependent on the goodwill of rivals or the stability of distant supply chains for everything from smartphones to missile guidance systems.
India sits squarely in that vulnerable position. Between FY17 and FY25, the country spent approximately USD 150 billion on semiconductor product imports, with those imports growing at a CAGR of 23%. Domestic manufacturing remains nascent. Demand is projected to reach USD 110 billion by FY2030 and exceed USD 200 billion by FY2035, and if the import trend continues unchecked, annual import bills could touch USD 240 billion by 2035. That figure would strain the current account and, more critically, leave defence electronics, satellite systems, and critical digital infrastructure exposed to external supply risk.
What the Policy Response Looks Like
The government's first structured answer was India Semiconductor Mission 1.0, launched in 2021 under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY). ISM 1.0 operates through an incentive framework of Rs 76,000 crore, offering fiscal support of up to 50% for silicon fabs, compound semiconductor facilities, and assembly and testing units. Twelve semiconductor manufacturing projects have since been approved, representing an investment pipeline of roughly Rs 1.64 lakh crore spanning silicon fabrication, silicon carbide fabs, memory packaging, and specialised assembly infrastructure.
Alongside this, C-DAC (Centre for Development of Advanced Computing) developed the DHRUV64, a fully indigenous 64-bit microprocessor, under the Microprocessor Development Programme (MDP). The DHRUV64 does not compete with leading commercial chips on performance. What it demonstrates is that India can design sovereign processor architecture, a capability that matters for defence and strategic applications where supply-chain trust is non-negotiable. The Semiconductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh, India's only operational fab, remains part of this broader sovereign capability conversation.
Union Budget 2026-27 announced India Semiconductor Mission 2.0, which the government describes as a move from ecosystem creation to ecosystem consolidation. ISM 2.0 is structured around six pillars: chip design, machines and materials, setting up additional fabs, further strengthening the ATMP-OSAT (Assembly, Testing, Marking and Packaging / Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) industry, research and development, and talent development. The explicit inclusion of semiconductor equipment and materials manufacturing is a meaningful escalation. ISM 1.0 largely attracted assemblers and packagers; ISM 2.0 attempts to pull upstream toward the tools and inputs that fabs actually need.
Where the Hard Problems Remain
At Semiconductor Summit 2026, the chief of the Semiconductor Laboratory flagged precisely the issues that policy documents tend to understate. Establishing a fabrication plant requires several billion dollars and long gestation periods before a single wafer is produced commercially. India remains dependent on foreign suppliers for advanced fabrication equipment, and export controls by the US and its allies make that equipment harder to acquire. Semiconductor manufacturing also demands uninterrupted power, ultra-pure water, and logistics reliability that India's industrial infrastructure does not yet uniformly provide. The specialised workforce, engineers trained in fabrication processes, chip design, and materials science, does not exist at the scale the industry requires.
ISM 2.0's talent pillar acknowledges the skill gap, but building that pipeline takes a decade, not a budget cycle. India's policy architecture is now more coherent than it has ever been. Whether it is sufficient to make India a credible node in global chip manufacturing depends on execution speed, private investment follow-through, and whether the infrastructure and human capital gaps can be closed before the demand curve outruns domestic supply.