Internal Security29 September 20264 min read
India's nuclear doctrine draws fresh scrutiny, with calls for periodic review, not overhaul
India's nuclear doctrine, largely unchanged since its operationalisation in 2003, is facing renewed scrutiny over changes in the strategic, technological and geopolitical environment. The Bangladesh-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on strategic civil nuclear cooperation, signed in September 2026, is part of that changing regional setting. It has prompted debate on whether the doctrine should be revisited without being completely overhauled.
What the doctrine says
The doctrine emerged in the late 1990s. The 1998 Pokhran-II tests established India as a nuclear weapons state, and the 1999 Kargil War showed that nuclear deterrence did not rule out conventional conflict. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) operationalised the doctrine in 2003, on the basis of the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine.
Its core principles are:
- Credible Minimum Deterrence: a sufficient, non-country-specific arsenal that guarantees unacceptable damage to an adversary.
- No First Use (NFU): nuclear weapons are to be used only in retaliation to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces.
- Massive Retaliation: any retaliatory strike is to be massive enough to inflict incalculable damage.
- Civilian control: authorisation rests with the Nuclear Command Authority. Its Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the sole authority to release nuclear weapons. Its Executive Council, chaired by the National Security Advisor, provides strategic inputs and executes directives.
- Negative security assurance: no use against non-nuclear weapon states, except that India retains the option to retaliate against major chemical or biological attacks.
- A moratorium on nuclear testing, with advocacy of verifiable, non-discriminatory global disarmament.
The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 estimates that India has 190 warheads (12 deployed, 178 in reserve), slightly ahead of Pakistan's 170 but well behind China's 620. It also noted that the May 2025 Operation Sindoor confrontation was the first time India and Pakistan integrated cyber warfare into a military conflict.
Why a revisit is argued
When the doctrine was drafted, China and Pakistan presented distinct, isolated threats. Their military and nuclear postures are now deeply interconnected. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal and modernising infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control, while Pakistan relies on nuclear posturing to offset India's conventional superiority.
Pakistan has also developed low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, such as the Nasr missile, that could be used in a limited conflict. This strains the Massive Retaliation promise of a large-scale response to a nuclear attack. Experts therefore debate whether India should keep Credible Minimum Deterrence and No First Use while developing more flexible and proportionate response options.
New technologies add to the pressure. Artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and hypersonic glide vehicles compress early-warning and decision-making timelines. The argument is that a review is needed to harden India's Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) infrastructure against cyber-sabotage and to protect the survivability of second-strike capability.
The neighbourhood is also more crowded. The US entry into Bangladesh's nuclear sector comes at a time when Russia is dominant through the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant and China is also courting Dhaka. India takes part in Rooppur by supplying non-critical equipment, materials and training through a trilateral framework. Those making the case for review say external powers are using civil nuclear technology to build influence along India's borders.
What is proposed
The suggestion is periodic review rather than an overhaul. The specific steps are:
- Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), which the NFU pledge needs in order to remain credible. This means faster commissioning of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) such as INS Arighat and the S4 class, and fielding Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV), demonstrated in the Agni-V Divyastra test, to overwhelm adversary ballistic missile defence.
- A hardened NC3 network, secured against cyber-sabotage, AI-driven data spoofing and ASAT blinding, with space-based surveillance so the Nuclear Command Authority gets uninterrupted intelligence in a crisis.
- Better integration of the Chief of Defence Staff into nuclear decision-making, building on the Kargil Review Committee (1999) and the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security (2012). The CDS is described as the bridge between the Political Council and the tri-services Strategic Forces Command.
- Calculated strategic ambiguity, with flexible, proportionate response options, so that the tactical weapons problem is addressed without altering the NFU text and adversaries cannot exploit predictable gaps on the escalation ladder.
The doctrine has given strategic stability and policy continuity for over two decades. The case made is that survivable forces and secure command systems can sustain deterrence without rewriting it.