International Relations31 October 20265 min read
India at the 13th ADMM-Plus: From Act East Rhetoric to Concrete Security Commitments in the Indo-Pacific
What Happened in Cebu and Why It Matters
When India's Defence Minister addressed the 13th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Cebu, Philippines, the significance lay not just in attendance but in the specificity of what was offered. Defence-ministerial participation in a multilateral security forum signals political will. The concrete proposals tabled at Cebu suggested India is now prepared to back that will with institutional commitments.
ADMM-Plus was inaugurated in Hanoi in October 2010 as a platform bringing together the ten ASEAN member states and eight dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States. It is the region's premier defence diplomacy forum, and since 2017 it has met annually, giving it a rhythm that older, more episodic formats lacked. Its work is organised around seven priority areas — maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian mine action, and cybersecurity — each supported by an Experts' Working Group that does the technical heavy lifting between ministerial meetings.
India's Offers on Counter-Terrorism and Maritime Security
On counter-terrorism, India proposed strengthening collective capabilities through joint military exercises, capacity-building programmes, and intelligence sharing. The Defence Minister cited Operation Sindoor, India's recent military action against cross-border and state-sponsored terrorism, as evidence of the kind of operational experience India brings to the table. The reference was deliberate. It positioned India not as a country that theorises about terrorism but as one that has acted against it and is willing to share the lessons.
This offer has institutional backing. India and Malaysia co-chair the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Counter-Terrorism for the 2024–2027 cycle, which means India is not merely a participant in this agenda but a driver of it.
On maritime security, India's pitch was equally substantive. The Defence Minister highlighted 2026 as the ASEAN–India Year of Maritime Cooperation and pointed to the Second ASEAN–India Maritime Exercise as evidence of growing operational familiarity between the two sides. India invoked the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the governing legal framework for freedom of navigation, overflight, and the security of maritime trade routes, a framing that carries pointed relevance given ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. The Indian Navy's continuous operational presence in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, protecting commercial shipping from piracy, was cited as a concrete record of burden-sharing rather than a promise of future action.
The Institutional Depth Behind Act East
India's Act East Policy has often been criticised for producing summits and statements without durable structures. The Cebu engagement pushes back against that critique on two fronts. The co-chairmanship of the Counter-Terrorism Working Group with Malaysia through 2027 locks India into a multi-year institutional role with deliverables and review cycles. The proposed Defence Youth Bridge, aimed at strengthening India–ASEAN people-to-people connections, promoting digital innovation, and building capacity among young defence professionals, adds a longer-horizon dimension that goes beyond hardware and exercises.
The offers made at the 13th ADMM-Plus reflect a deliberate effort to translate India's Indo-Pacific vocabulary — a secure, stable, and resilient region based on international law — into roles that carry accountability. For aspirants tracking India's security diplomacy, the forum itself, the working-group architecture beneath it, and the specific commitments India has now made within that architecture are all worth understanding as a system rather than as isolated events.