Economy23 September 20264 min read
India's trade deficit with China widens to USD 112.16 billion in 2025-26
India's trade deficit with China widened to USD 112.16 billion in 2025-26 from USD 99.21 billion in 2024-25, with bilateral trade at USD 167.6 billion in 2025. Between 2021 and 2025, India's exports to China stayed largely flat while imports rose nearly 71%, from USD 87.5 billion to USD 149.5 billion.
Manufacturing capacity is expanding under the push for Atmanirbhar Bharat, but much of it runs on Chinese intermediate goods, components and capital goods. The pattern has been described as an "assembly trap": high downstream assembly with limited upstream component manufacturing.
What India buys from China
The deficit is not driven by consumers buying finished Chinese retail goods. Intermediate goods account for nearly 70% of imports from China and capital goods for another 22%. Complete disengagement would therefore halt Indian factory lines, not just empty retail shelves.
China supplied 80% or more of India's imports in 636 tariff lines in FY26, against 461 in FY19. About 80% of imports from China are concentrated in electronics, machinery, organic chemicals and plastics, and electronics alone account for around USD 38 billion. India's exports to China are mainly low-value primary commodities such as iron ore, cotton and marine products.
Why assembly has not reduced dependence
The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme and the Phased Manufacturing Programme (PMP) have expanded downstream electronics assembly. Without a strong domestic precision-component ecosystem, however, India remains dependent on Chinese inputs. In smartphones, the share of imported parts and sub-assemblies in the China import basket rose from 3.3% in 2022 to 10.1% in 2025, which indicates limited domestic value addition (DVA) despite rising production and exports.
Other factors contribute. India's participation in the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) reduced tariffs on several IT products, and the absence of strong domestic electronics champions limited its ability to compete with Chinese makers. An inverted duty structure can make raw materials costlier than imported semi-knocked-down kits, which discourages tier-2 and tier-3 component makers. R&D spending stays at about 0.64-0.7% of GDP, and cheap Chinese components can weaken the incentive to invest in indigenous technology.
Exposure is sharpest in a few sectors:
- Active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs): 65% to 70% of basic APIs, intermediates and key starting materials come from China.
- Green energy: over 75% to 80% of solar cells and modules, plus critical components for electric vehicles and lithium-ion battery cells.
- Electronics: integrated circuits, telecom equipment and printed circuit board assemblies make up almost a quarter of imports from China.
- Rare earth magnets: China controls roughly 90% of global manufacturing. When it imposed export controls on these magnets in April 2025, Indian auto manufacturers faced production slowdowns.
The policy dilemma and proposed steps
Chinese components are cheaper because of decades of state subsidies, integrated industrial clusters and economies of scale. High customs duties or blanket restrictions would raise costs for Indian manufacturers, and finished exports such as formulated generic drugs or assembled electronics could lose price competitiveness. Lower direct imports from China may also not mean lower dependence if goods are rerouted through third countries such as Hong Kong. Several East Asian economies strengthened domestic industries before liberalising trade; India opened its markets without building sufficient manufacturing competitiveness.
The measures suggested are:
- Future PLI rounds should reward domestic value addition, precision tooling and local supplier networks rather than final assembly, with ministries mapping value-chain gaps such as specific mobile ICs and solar cells.
- The Design-Linked Incentive (DLI) scheme should extend beyond semiconductors to telecom and EVs.
- Recycling of e-waste, solar panels and spent EV batteries could recover lithium, cobalt and rare earths. India generated 13.98 lakh tonnes of e-waste in 2024-25, up from 12.54 lakh tonnes in 2023-24.
- Friendshoring and a China Plus One strategy would build supply-chain partnerships with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Europe and ASEAN.
- Phased, targeted tariffs should apply only to components with viable domestic substitutes, giving MSMEs a protected window.
- Tier-2 and tier-3 MSME suppliers should get shared R&D facilities, plug-and-play manufacturing clusters and affordable credit.