Economy30 October 20265 min read
From Revenue Tool to Reform Instrument: Why India's Disinvestment Policy Still Falls Short of Its Ambition
The IDBI Moment and What It Reveals
When the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved the strategic sale of a 60.72% stake in IDBI Bank to a private entity for Rs 52,878 crore, it did more than clear a single transaction. It signalled that the government was serious, at least for now, about a disinvestment push that had produced eight consecutive years of missed targets. Plans to list India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd were announced alongside, reinforcing the message that disinvestment is being repositioned as a macroeconomic strategy rather than a last-resort budget balancer.
But the IDBI approval also invites scrutiny. A single large-ticket deal does not resolve the structural problems that have plagued the programme for decades.
Disinvestment means the government selling or diluting its equity stake in Public Sector Enterprises. It is not the same as liberalisation, which relaxes regulations without transferring ownership, nor is it identical to privatisation, which implies a complete transfer of ownership and management control. Within disinvestment itself, three distinct forms exist. Minority disinvestment keeps the government above 51% with management control intact, as with the LIC IPO. Majority disinvestment hands control to the buyer while the state retains a residual stake. Strategic disinvestment transfers both ownership and management, as happened with Air India's sale to the Tata Group in 2022 and as is now underway with IDBI Bank. The nodal agency overseeing all of this is the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (DIPAM) under the Ministry of Finance.
The Policy Architecture and the Economic Case
The intellectual scaffolding for current decisions rests on several layers. The Rangarajan Committee of 1993 first recommended that government ownership in strategic sectors could be diluted to 49%, and up to 100% in non-strategic ones. The G.V. Ramakrishna Commission of 1996 built on this by advising a strict classification of CPSEs into strategic, core, and non-core domains. These recommendations took three decades to crystallise into the New Public Sector Enterprise Policy 2021, which identifies strategic sectors — atomic energy, defence, banking, petroleum, and a few others — where the government will maintain a bare minimum presence of one to four companies, and non-strategic sectors where CPSEs will be privatised or shut down.
Running alongside this is the National Monetisation Pipeline, which recycles capital by leasing mature brownfield assets to private players rather than selling them outright. After achieving roughly 90% of its Phase 1 goals, NMP 2.0 has set a target of Rs 16.72 lakh crore for FY2026–2030.
The economic rationale is straightforward. Disinvestment generates non-debt capital receipts, reducing the government's need to borrow and limiting the crowding out of private investment. It also subjects CPSEs to market discipline. Between 2014 and 2019, the BSE CPSE Index returned just 4% on average while the BSE Sensex surged 38%. That underperformance was a primary justification for the shift toward strategic sales rather than token equity dilutions.
Where Execution Breaks Down
The gap between policy intent and outcome has several causes, and they are structural rather than incidental.
The first is valuation. The Comptroller and Auditor General evaluates CPSEs on the basis of their land banks and physical assets, while private bidders use discounted future cash flows. This mismatch routinely stalls bids and generates political accusations of underselling or cronyism.
The second is market absorption. When the government offloads large tranches through Offer for Sale, it pulls liquidity out of domestic capital markets and can crowd out IPOs from private startups and MSMEs — the very firms that disinvestment is supposed to make room for.
Privatising natural monopolies without empowered regulators creates a third problem. Handing airports or energy grids to private players without strengthening bodies like AERA or PNGRB risks replacing a public monopoly with a private oligopoly. Legacy land disputes — the VSNL land demerger case being the most cited example — can derail transaction timelines for years.
Reform proposals worth examining include a rolling three-year privatisation pipeline that gives investors time for due diligence, calibrated disinvestment to the 51% threshold across the 95 listed PSEs (analysts estimate this could yield approximately Rs 9 lakh crore while keeping the state as the largest shareholder), and ring-fencing proceeds through the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund so that receipts fund capital creation rather than plugging revenue deficits. Singapore's Temasek Holdings separates the state's regulatory role from its ownership role entirely, while China's SASAC consolidates assets and drives mergers before partial listing. Both models offer lessons India has yet to fully absorb.