Polity12 October 20265 min read
Delhi Police detain protesters citywide; legal basis questioned as UAPA bail rules face scrutiny
Delhi Police detained protesters in large numbers across the capital, including from areas beyond the New Delhi district, and legal experts have questioned the basis for doing so. The police said the detentions followed violations of prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which bar unauthorised assemblies, demonstrations and protests. Section 163 empowers an executive magistrate to issue such orders where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. There was no clarity on the authority used to detain people from areas where such orders were not in force.
Separately, the death anniversary of Professor G.N. Saibaba has brought fresh attention to prolonged pre-trial detention and civil liberties under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967.
What the law says on protest
Article 19(1)(a) protects free speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Neither is absolute. Article 19(2) permits restrictions on speech on specific grounds, including public order, and Article 19(3) allows "reasonable restrictions" on peaceful assembly in the interest of public order.
Delhi Police guidelines lay down how to seek permission to demonstrate at Jantar Mantar. Applications must ordinarily reach the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) at least 10 days before the event. The DCP considers whether the demonstration is likely to obstruct traffic or endanger human safety or public tranquillity. Gatherings there cannot exceed 1,000 people; beyond that, the venue can be Ramlila Ground.
An organiser who thinks a refusal is arbitrary can approach the Delhi High Court under Article 226. If a protest continues despite denial or in violation of a prohibitory order, participants can be booked under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which deals with knowingly disobeying a lawful order of a public servant.
Limits on preventive detention
Preventive detention means holding a person to prevent a possible crime. Punitive detention punishes an offence after trial and conviction. The grounds for preventive detention are security of the state, maintenance of public order, maintenance of supplies and essential services, defence, and foreign affairs or the security of India.
Article 22 sets the safeguards: production before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours, the right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of choice, and being told the grounds of arrest and detention. Preventive custody is allowed for 3 months at the first instance, and any extension requires referral to an Advisory Board.
Supporters say it helps counter terrorism, insurgency and organised crime, can stop escalation during unrest or communal tension, and deters unlawful activity. They also point out that Article 22(3)-(7) recognises it. Critics point to its colonial origin, when it was largely used against freedom fighters, and to the state's ability to withhold grounds in the public interest, which leaves room for arbitrary action. They add that it can bypass fair-trial safeguards and discourage the exercise of Article 19 freedoms.
In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011), the Supreme Court said preventive detention cannot substitute for ordinary criminal law when its requirements are not met. Orders can be challenged where mandatory safeguards were ignored or other legal defects exist.
The UAPA and the bail question
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, lets the government probe and prosecute terrorism and designate organisations as "unlawful associations" or "terrorist organisations", and individuals as "terrorists". It was enacted on the recommendation of the National Integration Council, set up in 1961, and originally dealt largely with secessionist activities, without explicit mention of terrorism.
Amendments followed in 2004, when terrorist activities were added to the title; after the 26/11 attacks, when the definition of terrorism was broadened and bail conditions tightened; in 2012, when "economic security" was brought in and counterfeit currency offences became terrorist acts; and in 2019, when the government gained power to designate individuals as terrorists. The 2019 change was criticised as overturning the presumption of innocence.
Section 35 allows the Centre to designate an organisation or individual as a terrorist. Sections 38 and 39 criminalise specified association with and support for terrorist organisations. Section 43D(5) requires courts to deny bail if, on the police report or case diary, there are reasonable grounds to believe the allegations are prima facie true.
Critics say this test brings elements of a trial into the bail stage, contradicting the presumption of innocence, and that prolonged detention without formal charges conflicts with Article 21. They also cite vague definitions of "unlawful activity" and "terrorist act", use against activists, journalists and students, and special courts that can use secret witnesses and closed-door hearings.
The Supreme Court has addressed some of these concerns. In National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019), it held that courts must examine whether accusations are prima facie true at the bail stage without a detailed trial. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), it held that prolonged imprisonment and unreasonable trial delay can justify bail under Article 21 despite Section 43D(5). In Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021), it held that mere association with a terrorist organisation is not enough for conviction under Sections 38 and 39 unless the required intention is established.
Reforms proposed
The proposed changes include amending the UAPA for clearer definitions and softer bail restrictions, periodic judicial review to prevent misuse, and guidelines against use of the law on dissent. On preventive detention, the proposal is that it stay strictly limited and proportionate, with strict Article 22 compliance, effective remedies and preference for ordinary criminal law where adequate.